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“On the one hand, we have to see the
world in terms of the choices made by
these local communities; on the other,
we have to remember that Rome was
not the only imperialist power [in the
East], and that Roman control was
fluctuating and incomplete throughout
most of the century”.2
In  Mithridates VI Eupator instigated a great number of Greek poleis.
With Ephesus at its head, they systematically murdered, on the same day,
all the romaioi who for decades had controlled their ports and were in
charge of collecting vectigalia in the name of Rome.3 All of this took
place a fewmonths after Mithridates’ spring intervention in the province
of Asia, when the Pontic kingdom took advantage of the Republic’s
1 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and ICREA (T. Ñaco del Hoyo). This paper,
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by the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation (New York, USA), as well as the research project
HAR– granted by the Spanish Ministry of Science, and SGR  by the
Catalonian government. We would want to thank Ted Kaizer and Olivier Hekster for
their kind invitation, as well as John Strisino for his assistance. All dates are bc unless
otherwise noted.
2 F. Millar, ‘The Mediterranean and the Roman revolution: politics, war, and the
economy’, in H.M. Cotton—G.M. Rogers (eds.), Rome, the Greek World, and the East
vol.  (Chapel Hill—London ), –.
3 Appian, Mithridateios ; ; ; Cicero, pro Lege Manilia .; .; Cicero, pro
Flacco ; ; Livius, Periochae ; Velleius Paterculus, ..; Valerius Maximus, ..;
Tacitus, Annales ..; Plutarch, Sulla .; Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos
..–; Eutropius, ..; Florus ... See, most recently: S. Alcock, ‘Making sure you
know whom to kill: spatial strategies and strategic boundaries in the Eastern Roman
Empire’,Millennium  (), –; T. Ñaco—B. Antela-Bernárdez—I. Arrayás-Mora-
les—S. Busquets-Artigas, ‘The impact of the Roman intervention in Greece and Asia
Minor upon civilians (–bc)’, in B. Antela—T. Ñaco (eds.), Transforming Historical
Landscapes in the Ancient Empires, BA.R., Int.Ser.  (Oxford ), –; A. Mayor,
The Poison King (Princeton ), –.
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weakness, still in the midst of the Social War, to advance decisively over
Roman territory. Later on, in , the deportation of the majority of the
population of the city of Chios, also under Mithridates’ orders, had the
contrary effect on Greek public opinion, which largely rejected it, even
in the cities that had initially supported the Pontic king.4
Both cases indicate that the Mithridatic Wars elevated the scale of
violence in the Eastern Mediterranean to rates that were previously
unknown, with intense combats and harsh reprisals. Nevertheless, nei-
ther army suffered the most in the conflict; the situation of intense war
and prolonged periods of ‘cold war’ notably increased collateral damage,
which took the form of sieges and plunder of the urban centres, seriously
affecting its inhabitants. Confronted with such atrocities, it was very dif-
ficult for the poleis to respond unanimously, for they were socially and
politically divided; a situation thatwas undoubtedly used by both powers.
The support to eitherMithridates or the Republic depended onwho con-
trolled the city at each moment, either the demos or certain aristocratic
factions. After all, the survival of these elites also depended on the even-
tual success or failure of their political alliance with one of the two super-
powers.5 It is precisely this ‘ultimate frontier’, understood in geostrategi-
cal terms, that this article will analyze in detail, using evidence from the
cities of continental Greece, the islands and Asia Minor.
Six Towns, Two Superpowers, One Destiny
During the year /, Athens suffered a harsh slave revolt.6 The
economic losses resulted in the impoverishment of a good portion of
Athenian society.7 In the following decade, the most significant posts in
4 AppianMithridateios –; Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ),
; M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford ),
; –; W.Z. Rubinsohn, ‘Mithridates VI Eupator Dionysos and Rome’s conquest
of the Hellenistic east’, Mediterranean Historical Review . (), –; R. Kallet-
Marx, Hegemony to Empire (Berkeley—Los Angeles—London ), ; L. Ballesteros
Pastor,Mitrídates Eupator, rey del Ponto (Granada ), –; J.Thornton, ‘Terrore,
terrorismo e imperialismo. Violenza e intimidazione nell’età della conquista romana’, in
G. Urso (ed.), Terror et pavor (Pisa ), –.
5 F. Santangelo, Sulla, the Elites and the Empire (Leiden-Boston ), –; J.M.
Madsen, ‘The ambitions of Mithridates VI: Hellenistic kingship and modern Interpreta-
tion’, in J.M. Højte (ed.),Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom (Aarhus ), –.
6 SIG2 ; E. Badian, ‘Rome, Athens and Mithridates’, American Journal of Ancient
History  (), –; S.V. Tracy, IG II2  (Meisenheim amGlan ), –.
7 S.V. Tracy, ‘Athens in ’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology  (), .
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Athenian politics were held by a reduced number of figures,8probably the
only oneswith sufficient capital to confront the elevated costs of themain
positions of public responsibility.9 The source of wealth of this dominat-
ing group, withMedeios of Piraeus at its head, apparently came from the
commerce of the island of Delos.10 Actually, the men who monopolized
political posts during the decade of the s also did the same with the
rest of the offices onDelos. In ,Medeioswas elected and then re-elected
Archon several times until ,11 and in /, anarchíawas declared.This
unusual situation is reflected in Athenion’s speech, in which he judged
the Roman senate responsible for the situation in Athens. Thus, with
the support of many impoverished citizens,12 Athenion seized power in
Athens.13He then sentApellicon of Teos toDelos to assureAthenian con-
trol over the Delian treasure.14 The mission was unsuccessful, and noth-
ing more is known of Athenion or Apellicon.15 Shortly after, the Pontic
general Archelaos reduced Delos by force.16 The money obtained helped
finance the government of the EpicureanAristion, who governedAthens
as a loyal ally of Mithridates until Sulla deposed him in .17
Unlike Athens, the city of Kos almost brought disaster on itself in 
by joining the poleis of Asia that had sided with Mithridates. Fortunately
8 P. MacKendrick, The Athenian Aristocracy  to bc (Cambridge ), ;
E. Badian, op. cit. (n. ), ; Tracy, op. cit. (n. ), –.
9 D. Glew, ‘The Selling of the King’,Hermes  (), ; S.V. Tracy, op. cit. (n. ),
.
10 On Athens and Delos: C. Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Anthony (Cambridge
), –. On the Roman interests in Delos, see: C. Hasenohr—C. Müller, ‘Gentil-
ices et circulation des Italiens: quelques reflexions méthodologiques’, in C. Hasenohr—
C.Müller (eds.), Les Italiens dans le Monde Grec (Paris ), –; C. Habicht, ‘Roman
citizens in Athens (–)’, in M.C. Hoff—S.I. Rotroff (eds.), The Romanization of
Athens (Oxford ), –; C. Hasenohr, ‘Les Italiens à Délos: entre romanité et hel-
lénisme’,Pallas  (), –.OnAthens andRome: E. Candiloro, ‘Politica e cultura
en Atene da Pidna alla guerra Mitridaica’, Studi Classici e Orientali  (), –.
11 An unprecedented event in Athenian politics: E. Badian, op. cit. (n. ), .
12 Pausanias, Description of Greece ...; B. Antela-Bernárdez, ‘Between Medeios
and Mithridates: The Peripathetic Constitution of Athens in bc’, Zeitschrift für Papy-
rologie und Epigraphik  (), –.
13 Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae .–; L. Ballesteros Pastor, ‘Atenión’, Studia His-
torica. Historia Antigua  (), –.
14 C. Hoff, ‘Sulla’s siege of Athens in /bc and its aftermath’, in Hoff—Rotroff ,
op. cit. (n. ), ; B. Antela-Bernárdez, ‘Sila no vino a aprender Historia Antigua’, Revue
des Études Anciennes . (), –.
15 B. Antela-Bernárdez, op.cit. (n. ).
16 Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae D–B; Appian, Mithridateios ; Pausanias ;
,; Plutarch, Lucullus ..
17 G.R. Bugh, ‘Athenion and Aristion’, Phoenix  (), –.
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for Kos, its actions at the beginning and end of the Pontic dominion of
Asia were sufficient to avoid the direct consequences of Roman revenge,
because, like Chios, Kos protected the Roman and Italian settlers from
themassacre that spread throughout theAsian cities.18 Kos only accepted
to surrender toMithridates’ demands out of pure necessity, for the island
was not prepared to sustain a Pontic assault, like neighbouring Rhodes
had done.19 Instead, the latter showed itself a loyal ally of Rome. From
the beginning of Roman intervention in Hellenistic affairs, at the end of
the third century bc, Rhodes played a predominant role in the relations
between Rome and the local powers, although the tensions that broke
out periodically conditioned the policy of the city for the following
centuries. After Pydna (), the Republic punished Rhodes’ ambiguous
attitude during the Third Macedonian War. This was carried out by
directly attacking the commercial capacities of Lycia and Caria and
creating the free Port of Delos.20 Considering the complex Romano-
Rhodian relationship of the second century, as well as their behaviour
during the FirstMithridaticWar, it is hardly surprising that the Rhodians
adopted a resigned and loyal alliance with Rome, conscious that the
latter unquestionably dominated the whole Mediterranean, despite the
temporary victories of Mithridates.21
During the very last period of the First Mithridatic War, Pergamon
and other Asian poleiswere directly involved in combat (Memnon (Frag-
mente der griechischen Historiker ), .). The imminent arrival of
Fimbria forced Mithridates to flee the city that he had made his capi-
tal since the winter of , while he helplessly watched the defection of
most of the Asian poleis.22 There are three inscriptions that refer to the
king’s period at Pergamon that are dedicated to his supporters: two in
18 A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East bc to ad (London
), .
19 K. Buraselis, Kos. Between Hellenism and Rome (Philadelphia ), .
20 E.S. Gruen,The Hellenistic World and the coming of Rome (Berkeley-Los Angeles-
London ), –.
21 Its role as a Roman ally may already be seen in the campaigns against the pirates:
H.A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool-London ), –; Ph. de
Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-RomanWorld (Cambridge ); Ph. de Souza, ‘Naval battles
and sieges’, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (Cambridge ), ;
–.
22 Appian,Mithridateios ; ; Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos ..; Livi-
us,Periochae .; Plutarch, Sulla .; Lucullus .;Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen
Historiker ), .; Ballesteros Pastor , op. cit. (n. ), –; F. de Callataÿ,
L’histoire des guerres mithridatiques vue par les monnaies (Louvain-la-Neuve ) ; –
; –; –; .
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honour of respective strategoi (I.Perg. –) and one dedicated to the
priest Asclepiades (I.Perg. ). A fourth onemight have honoured a pro-
Roman strategos, who, at the arrival of Fimbria, resisted in the acropolis
(I.Perg. ; IGRR , ).23 The inscription records the stress suffered
in Pergamon in those days; a divided city and symbol of the adherence
of the Asian cities to the Pontic cause,24 which had, furthermore, partic-
ipated in the massacre of romaioi decreed by Eupator.25 It is possible that
the strategos took over the reign of the city after the flight of the king,
as the leader of the pro-Roman elite faction and, therefore, initiated the
transition towards the restitution of Roman control.26
During the Mithridatic wars, the destiny of Heraclea Pontica was
marked by a calculated equidistance between Rome’s interests and those
of the Pontic king. Most of the historical evidence for this period derives
from the historian, Memnon who was probably of Heraclean origin.27
Despite the geographical proximity of Pontus, Heraclea’s pro-Roman
character was well established since the beginning of the second cen-
tury, probably thanks to a certainmilitary alliance ofmutual protection.28
After receiving several legations from Heraclea during the war between
Antiochus III and Rome (–), Memnon records the brothers Pub-
lius and Cornelius Scipio sending a letter ratifying, in the name of the
senate, the terms of a military alliance. It was promulgated through a
double inscription in bronze (Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen His-
toriker ), .–). However, since there exists a similar inscription
refering to Heraclea under Latmos, this may cause a degree of confu-
sion. This inscription, attributed to the second Heraclea and dated to
23 T. Drew-Bear, ‘Deux décrets hellénistiques d’Asie Mineure’, Bulletin de Correspon-
dence Hellénique  (), –; C.P. Jones, ‘Diodoros Pasparos and the Nikephoria
of Pergamon’, Chiron  (), –.
24 B.C. McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus (Leiden
), –; B. Virgilio, Gli Attalidi di Pergamo (Pisa ), –.
25 M. Sartre, ‘Tuez-les tous ou les Grecs, Rome et Mithridate VI Eupator’, Histoires
Grecques (Paris ), –.
26 Virgilio , op. cit. (n. ), –.
27 H.B. Mattingly, ‘Rome’s earliest relations with Byzantium, Heraclea Pontica and
Callatis’, in A.G. Poulter (ed.), Ancient Bulgaria (Nottingham ), ; –; –
; L. Jonnes,The inscriptions of Heraclea Pontica (Bonn ); S.Y. Saprykin,Heracleia
Pontica andTauric Chersonesus before RomanDomination. VI–I centuries bc (Amsterdam
).
28 S.M. Burstein, Outpost of Hellenism: the emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea
(Berkeley—London—Los Angeles ), –; D.B. Erciyas,Wealth, aristocracy and royal
propaganda under the Hellenistic kingdom of the Mithradatids (Leiden-Boston ), ;
.
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c. , mentions a letter, in which both Scipios recognized the ‘free-
dom’ of the city, just before announcing the arrival of L. Orbius, “so
that no one should trouble you” (CIG , lin. –), perhaps as
the head of a hypothetical Roman garrison. Actually, in the midst of
the Macedonian War in , Heraclea Pontica sent two triremes to
Chalcis, where the Roman fleet of M. Lucretius was docked, although
the latter refused the reinforcements (Livy, ..–). This dispatch
must have been part of themilitary obligations assumed by various cities
of the Black Sea, Heraclea among them, established in the treaty that
ended the war between Pharnaces of Pontus and Eumenes II of Perg-
amon (–). In fact, the inscription, which preserves some of its
clauses, already reveals the increasing Roman influence over the region,
which was made more explicit at the end of the Third Macedonian War
in .29
ConfrontingMithridates & Rome:
Collateral Damage among the Greeks
The commercial and mercantile capacity of the port of Delos was com-
pletely linked to the maintenance of the circulation of goods from the
recently created Roman province of Asia.30 Many of the Italian residents
in Delos were dedicated to the mercantile relations between Rome and
the East.31 Still, despite their number, there is nomention of any Romaioi
from Delos having suffered the Ephesian Vespers.32 Amiotti has showed
the adherence (through clientage) of themajority of the victims, probably
negotiatores, to the Marian party. Additionally, we also know of the links
that existed between the governing elite of Athens, throughMedeios, and
the Marian faction during the decade of the s, if not before.33 There-
fore, blaming the senate of theAthenian anarchia, Athenion’swordsmust
be taken into consideration. It is very probable that, despite the theo-
29 Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ), .; J.-L. Ferrary, Philhel-
lénisme et impérialisme (Rome ), –; n. ; J. Ma, Antiochos III and the Cities
of Western Asia Minor (Oxford ), .
30 E. Will, Histoire Politique du Monde Hellénistique  (– av. J.C.) (Nancy ),
–; S.V. Tracy, op. cit. (n. ), –.
31 C. Hasenohr, ‘Les collèges de magistri et la communauté italienne de Délos’, in
Müller—Hasenohr , op. cit. (n. ), –.
32 G. Amiotti, ‘I Greci ed il massacre degli Italici nell’  a. C.’,Aevum (), –.
33 S. Byrne, ‘IG II2  and the Delia of /’, Zeitschrift Papyrologie Epigraphik 
(), .
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retical autonomy of Athens after the end of the Achaean War,34 Rome
would have favoured the creation of a dominant group throughwhich to
manage its relation with Athens.35 Furthermore, this pro-Roman aris-
tocratic group maintained its economic position through the onerous
Delian commerce, as is clear from the case of Medeios.36
Thus, the figure of Athenion remains as a sort of opposition to the ‘con-
servative’ elite, represented byMedeios. Athenion andApellicon,37 aswell
as their salient supporters, including Aristion, were all rich descendants
from foreign families with mercantile links to Delos, and had recently
acquired citizenship.38 In addition, they were also the commercial com-
petitors of the negotiatores and the Italians, who were allied to the aris-
tocrats led by Medeios. Thus, in opposition to the traditional and pro-
Roman elite of Medeios, the crisis in the s gave rise to a new social
and economic group, which aligned itself to Mithridates for the neces-
sary support to gain power in the city and depose the old aristocracy.39
Despite everything, Delos returned to its economic prowess; the pillar,
that in conflict, sustained the resources of the two groups.Whoever con-
trolled Delos would control Athens.
The internal struggle in Athens over the control of Delos was also a
fight between Mithridates and Rome. At the same time, it also meant a
dispute between the supporters ofMarius and the Sullani. Once the com-
mand against Mithridates was granted, and the king’s supporters substi-
tuted theMarian elite, Sulla managed to renew the economic relations of
the Delian negotiatores in his favour, eliminating the economic power of
Marius’ supporters in the East. After all, the First Mithridatic War high-
lights the complexity of the situation. It demonstrated the various links of
power between Rome and Athens. The external conflict between Rome
andPontus, then, exposed the fight over the political control of Athens, as
did the fight over the exploitation of the port of Delos by two groups of
34 Tacitus, Annals .; Strabo, Geographica .; S. Accame, Il dominio Romano in
Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto (Roma ), .
35 A.K. Schiller, ‘Multiple gentile affiliations and the Athenian response to Roman
domination’, Historia . (), –.
36 Schiller , op. cit. (n. ), –.
37 On the role of the philosophical schools in the Athenian uprising, see: Ferrary ,
op. cit. (n. ), –.
38 S. Dow, ‘A leader of the Anti-Roman party in Athens in bc’, Classical Philology 
(), –.
39 Cicero, Brutus ; Plutarch, Sulla .. On the fidelity of Athens to Rome until
the ‘anarchía’ year, see: H.B. Mattingly, ‘Some third magistrates in the Athenian new style
silver coinage’, in H.B. Mattingly (ed.), From Coins to History (Ann Arbor ), .
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wealthy Athenians, one traditional, the other composed from new rich
men.40 For Athens, the result was one of the most brutal sieges in its
history. As for Pontus, the transgression of its last boundary with Rome
meant the beginning of its own decomposition as a state.41
The inhabitants of Kos opened their port to Lucullus’ fleet and there-
fore their old alliance with Mithridates suddenly came to an end, very
likely with dramatic consequences for the anti-Roman factions.42 On the
other hand, the case of Cnidos, which also offered its port to the Roman
forces is similar, but it did not avoid Sulla’s reprisals.43An apparent will to
cooperate was, therefore, not sufficient for the Roman commanders. An
inscription found in Patara, Lycia, refers to the establishment of a garri-
son in Kos by contingents of Roman auxiliaries, commanded by a Lycian
named Krinolaos.44 At the beginning, Krinolaos’ troops served Rhodes.
Perhaps their service in Kos was of a different nature.This is a controver-
sial matter, though.According to Ch.Marek, the Lycians would have kept
an eye on the Pontic ships stationed at Kos, while K. Buraselis thinks that
their role was to garrison the island to avoid an uprising.45 A supporting
factor to Rome’s mistrust was the behaviour of Kos’ forces. As a matter of
fact, Lucullus incorporated the ships belonging to the poleis of Kos and
Cnidos with his own fleet and attacked Samos, where he was defeated.
After the loss, the ships of Kos and Cnidos returned to their ports, and
no longer collaborated militarily.46
Sulla rewarded or punished those Ancient cities whose attitudes
‘seemed’ favourable to Rome.Therefore, because Kos had opened its port
for the Romans towards the end of the First Mithridatic War, it found
itself in a relatively good position and receivedmixed rewards: it acquired
its freedom, but got no financial exemption.47 On the other hand, Rhodes
40 On the Roman financial situation during the Social War: Plutarch, Pompey .;
Orosius,Historiarum Adversum Paganos ..–; M.H. Crawford, Roman Republican
Coinage, Cambridge (), –; de Callataÿ , op. cit. (n. ), ; C.T. Barlow,
‘The Roman government and the economy, –bc’, Americal Journal of Philology 
(), –; Santangelo , op. cit. (n. ), .
41 B.C. McGing, ‘Subjection and resistance: to the death of Mithridates’, in A. Erskine
(ed.), A Companion to the Hellenistic World (Oxford ), –.
42 And that occurred between  and bc. A. Keaveney, Lucullus. A Life (London &
NY ), .
43 Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), .
44 Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), .
45 Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), –.
46 S.J. van Ooteghem, Lucius Licinius Lucullus (Namur ), ; A. Keaveney, Sulla.
The Last Republican (London ), .
47 Sherwin-White , op. cit. (n. ), .
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gained a larger recognition, i.e., immunitas, for having resisted the Pon-
tic forces practically on its own. Despite everything, these Roman con-
cessions progressively lost their practical use. Such, for instance, was the
case for Gytheion, a Peloponnesian city that suffered from the actions of
M. Antonius Creticus as he was preparing to invade Crete in .48 An
example of the contributions Kos was forced to give the Romans is found
in the Second Mithridatic War. Both the military operations of Murena
and Aulus Terentius Varro are related to the use of ships from Kos.49
Another intriguing problem, although difficult to solve with the avail-
able sources, is the evolution of coinage in Kos during the First Mithri-
datic War. The island as of  minted the tetraoboloi, i.e., since the Pon-
tic invasion of Asia. Kos did not mint coins again until –, and then
only in bronze.50The reasons for this may be due toMithridates partially
depleting Kos’ treasury as left by the Ptolomeic crown and, to the legal
dispositions issued by Sulla.
Although resignation to Roman preponderance seems to have lain
behind Rhodes’ military collaboration, the initiative behind the anti-
piracy campaigns came from Rhodes, not Rome, since it was the island’s
commercial routes which were most affected. Rhodes, then, was not
immune to the growing interest inMithridates from certain social circles
of Asia. Cicero points out that honours and statues were dedicated to
him in Athens and Rhodes (Cicero, In Verrem ..). In this sense, it
is important to underline that Mithridatic supporters in the Asian cities
mainly came from lower social classes, whilst in Rhodes the commercial
and landowning elite held control over the powerful commercial and
military fleet. Any kind of internal tension in Rhodes thus remains
unknown, although control clearly remained in pro-Roman hands. A
similar argument applies to Kos.51
Rhodes’ long resistance against the Pontic forces is, therefore, a dif-
ferentiating factor when comparing it with its neighbouring polis. This
difference in ‘foreign policy’ is directly related to military capacity, since
other factors bring the context of both cities together.52 When the Pon-
tic menace became a reality for the two poleis, Rhodes considered both
48 Accame , op. cit. (n. ), –; Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), .
49 Sherwin-White , op. cit. (n. ), ; Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), .
50 Buraselis , op. cit. (n. ), .
51 J. Thornton, ‘Misos Rhomaion o phobos Mithridatou? Echi storiografici di un dibat-
tito diplomatico’,Mediterraneo Antico . (), ff.
52 It hardly needs emphasising that both poleis are adjacent islands and in , kept a
close alliance with Rome.
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its military capacity and its internal and external affairs. Its insularity
and naval capacity53 were strong factors in favour of defending itself
against Mithridates’ troops. But military reasons are not enough to ex-
plain Rhodes’ firm defence; in fact, it was the fear of Rome’s return to
Asia, which drove Rhodes to risk a siege or Pontic attack. Given that
Rhodes had first-hand knowledge of the inflexibility of Rome’s han-
dling of unfaithful allies,54 its attitude during the First Mithridatic War
is plainly along the lines that they took after Pydna. After that con-
flict, Rhodes’ firm alliance to Rome was rewarded with the concession
of Caunus, Caria.55
As to Pergamon, the harsh punishments imposed by Sulla in  caused
themost severe socio-economic crisis ever suffered by most of the Asian
cities.56 Actually, disorder ensued and some poleis, too committed with
Mithridates’ policies in Asia, could hardly avoid Rome’s decisive repri-
sal.57 Pergamon’s condition as the old Mithridatic capital in Asia meant
the loss of all its privileges and of its free and federated status.58 Only
through the intercessionof eminent citizens, whowerewell thought of by
Roman authorities, did Pergamonmanage to overcome the severe crisis it
suffered and to restore its links with Rome.59 The political and economic
situation resulted in the emergence of a new civil elite. Besides the Italo-
Roman residents who, due to their wealth and influence, were integrated
in city life, there were also notable Greeks who were able to take advan-
tage of the situation and create great fortunes in commerce, through
speculating and lending (Cicero, Pro Flacco ). Paradoxically, these for-
tunes allowed them to establish friendly relations with the authorities and
residing romaioi, as well as to become the saviours of their poleis, which
earned them honours and exceptional privileges.60
53 V. Gabrielsen,The naval aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes (Aarhus ), –.
54 B.C. McGing, ‘Mithridates VI Eupator, Victim or Agressor?’, in Højte , op. cit.
(n. ), .
55 Kallet-Marx , op. cit. (n. ), . However, all Caria had been taken by Rome
from the Rhodian dominion after the III MacedonianWar.
56 Appian, Mithridateios ; Plutarch, Sulla .; Lucullus .; .; Cassiodorus,
Chronica . Ballesteros Pastor , op. cit. (n. ), –; de Callataÿ , op. cit.
(n. ), ; McGing , op. cit. (n. ), .
57 Livius, Periochae .; Plutarch, Lucullus .–; Suetonius, Iulius ..
58 Strabo,Geographica ..; Sallustius,Historiae .; Appian,Mithridateios ; ;
BellumCivile .; J.-M. Bertrand, Inscriptions historiques grecques (Paris ), –
n. .
59 J.-L. Ferrary, ‘Les Grecs des cités et l’obtention de la ciuitas Romana’, Citoyenneté et
participation à la basse époque hellénistique (Paris ), –.
60 M. Sartre, L’AsieMineure et l’Anatolie d’Alexandre àDioclétien (Paris ), –.
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Diodoros Pasparos, whose political activity covered the whole period
of Mithridatic wars, stands out among the evergetai of Pergamon.61 His
epigraphic record reflects the importance of his actions during the dra-
matic times in Pergamon and, in general, in the whole Asian province.62
An inscription of Diodoros tells us how he tried to recover all property of
those people who had been executed by Mithridates, or had died during
the war (IGRR , ). It seems to allude to the execution of  people
fromPergamon in , whowere accused of conspiring against the Pontic
king, and whose property was afterwards confiscated.63 It could, how-
ever, also refer to the execution of the Galatian tetrarchs, whose goods
were similarly extracted (Appian, Mithridateios , –), or even to
the confiscations suffered by the pro-Pontic faction in Pergamon, who
either committed suicide, were executed by Sulla, or fled with Eupator
after Dardanos (Appian, Mithridateios ).64 As it happens, recovery of
property lost by the proscribed during thewar contributed to a reduction
of social tension, and helped to reconcile civil life in Pergamon, which,
due to the conflict, had been divided between followers and detractors of
the king. This was especially problematic in a decimated city. Pergamon
was in a very precarious state of affairs as a result of disturbances, perse-
cutions and confiscations. This dramatic situation unleashed an intense
diplomatic activity directed towards Rome, led by the most eminent
members of Pergamon’s elite, and headed by Diodoros. The latter was
offered exceptional honours by his fellow citizens,65 who were encour-
aged by the success of his embassies and his flawless administration as
gymnasiarchos.66The restoration of the gymnasion and the celebration of
the XXIX Nikephoria (Plutarch, Lucullus .), the first since the begin-
ning of the war (IGRR , ), were both a responsibility of Diodoros’
towards , and constituted the first signs of the recuperation of Perga-
mon.67
61 H. Halfmann, Éphèse et Pergame (Bordeaux ), –.
62 IGRR ; ; ; ; Jones , op. cit. (n. ), ; Virgilio , op. cit. (n. ),
; .
63 Appian,Mithridateios ; Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos ...
64 McGing , op. cit. (n. ), ; ; Jones , op. cit. (n. ), –; Virgilio
, op. cit. (n. ), ; Ballesteros Pastor , op. cit. (n. ), –.
65 P. Gauthier, Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Athens ), –; Virgilio
, op. cit. (n. ), –.
66 Drew-Bear , op. cit. (n. ), ; Jones , op. cit. (n. ), ; Virgilio ,
op. cit. (n. ), ; ; .
67 Halfmann , op. cit. (n. ), –.
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During the Social War (–), Heraclea Pontica decided to offer mil-
itary support to the Republic, and, according to a controversial account
of Memnon, even sent two triremes all the way to Italy.68 If this were
true, it would show the extent to which Heraclea went to keep alive its
ancient military alliance with Rome (Memnon (Fragmente der griechi-
schen Historiker ), ). Despite its theoretical neutrality, the Greek
town must have been more disturbed by Pontic expansionism than by
Rome’s. Shortly after the defeat of Archelaos in Chaeronea (–), the
Heraclean fleet freed the prisoners of the city of Chios, which had prac-
tically been destroyed by Mithridates on account of having supported
Rhodes and Rome. Months later, Lucullus expelled the Pontic garrison
left in Chios as a measure of protection. Mithridates’ attempt to deport
the massive population of Chios to Pontus created great discomfort in
many Greek poleis, to the point that part of the elites started to conspire
against the king. He, in turn, tried to attract the favour of the demos in
these cities through the use of a clearly anti-aristocratic rhetoric (Appian,
Mithridateios ).69
This situation started to change at the beginning of the SecondMithri-
datic War, when both contending parties increased their demands. In
fact, the ‘Chios episode’ meant the beginning of the end of Heraclea’s
apparent neutrality in foreign policy.70 An episode in , as described by
Memnon, is particularly revealing for its further political consequences.71
The text notes the coinciding of two diplomatic delegations sent to Her-
aclea at the same time. One was dispatched by L. Licinius Murena, Sulla’s
promagistrate in Asia, the other by Mithridates (Cicero, pro Murena .
–). The leading elites of the city expressed their fear to the arrival of
Murena’s legates of what they considered an excessively close presence of
68 D. Dueck, ‘Memnon of Herakleia on Rome and the Romans’, in T. Bekker-Nielsen
(ed.), Rome and the Black Sea Region (Aarhus ), –.
69 Decree: R.K. Sherk, Rome and the Greek East (Cambridge ), n. . See also:
T. Reinach,Mithridate Eupator roi de Pont (Paris ), –; D. Magie, Roman Rule
in Asia Minor (Princeton ), ;  n. ;  n. ; Mattingly , op. cit. (n. ),
–;  (n. ); de Callataÿ , op. cit. (n. ),  n. ; Saprykin , op. cit.
(n. ), ff.
70 Appian,Mithridateios –; Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ),
; Plutarch, Lucullus .. Sherwin-White , op. cit. (n. ), ; Kallet-Marx ,
op. cit. (n. ), ; de Callataÿ , op. cit. (n. ),  n. .
71 Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ), . : ‘Therefore, they [the
Heracleians] replied to the ambassadors that inasmuch as so many wars were erupting,
they were hardly able to protect their own interests, let alone to provide assistance to
others’. Transl. Jonnes , op. cit. (n. ).
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Mithridatic armies to their chora. Even so, they did not commit them-
selves to the Roman demands either, with the excuse that their foremost
preoccupation was to look after the defence of their own interests.72
Thanks to Memnon we know the circumstances under which Hera-
clea switched to the Pontic faction in –, although his account may
not be very accurate. Thus, according to his version, Archelaos’ fleet not
only obtained provisions from the Greek city, but, taking two members
of Heraclea’s elite hostage, Archelaos also forced the authorities to hand
over five triremes to fight against Rome. Next, Memnon mentions the
dispatch of Roman publicani to the city to collect money, to which the
population responded with the killing of these Roman agents.73 Con-
sidering these events, it is more logical to see the decision of supply-
ing the Mithridatic fleet and the defection from the Roman side as a
reaction to the previous and inconvenient presence of publicani in Hera-
clea, and not the other way around. The decision would have been care-
fully deliberated during the inter-war period, and would then have been
made effective at Mithridates’ pressure. At the same time, all of this may
be concealing an internal fight between the interests of the demos, bet-
ter disposed to an alliance with the Pontic kingdom, and the interests
of some aristocratic factions, reluctant to abandon the traditional pro-
Roman policy, perhaps because they had previously established business
with Romans and Italians.74 In fact, the change of sides resulted in a long
siege and the brutal plunder of the city undertaken by Lucullus’ deputy,
M. Aurelius Cotta, Lucullus’ deputy (–; Memnon (Fragmente der
griechischen Historiker ), .–). Cotta had to face the consequences
of his actions once he returned to Rome, losing not only the booty, but
also his senatorial rank.75 As a result, the senate decided to allow the
72 D.G. Glew, ‘Between the wars: Mithridates Eupator and Rome, –bc’, Chiron 
(), –; Kallet-Marx , op. cit. (n. ), ; de Callataÿ , op. cit. (n. ),
–; Saprykin , op. cit. (n. ), –; J.-L. Ferrary, ‘L’essor de la puissance
romaine dans la zone pontique’, A. Bresson et al. (eds.), Une Koinè pontique (Bordeaux
), .
73 Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ), .–; Magie , op. cit.
(n. ), vol. , ; vol. , ; Sherwin-White , op. cit. (n. ), –; Dueck
, op. cit. (n. ), .
74 Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ), .; Kallet-Marx , op.
cit. (n. ), ; Saprykin , op. cit. (n. ), –; de Callataÿ , op. cit. (n. ),
–; Ferrary , op. cit. (n. ), –; S. Mitchell, ‘Geography, politics, and
imperialism in the Asian customs law’, in M. Cottier et all. (eds.), The Customs Law of
Asia (Oxford ), –; .
75 Appian, Mithridateios ; Memnon (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker ),
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restoration of Heraclea’s civic institutions and port infrastructure, al-
though the polis never regained its ancient splendour as a commercial
enclave of the Black Sea, nor its previous status (Memnon (Fragmente
der griechischen Historiker ), .; .; Strabo, Geographica ..).
Rome attempted to compensate, in this way, the damage done by Cotta,
although it certainly could not forget the treason of an ancient ally.76
In the end, Heraclea had paid a higher price than others for its sudden
decision to back the Mithridatic party.
The Mithridatic Wars, the ‘Ultimate Frontier’
Thewars betweenRome andMithridates VI emerge as the ‘ultimate fron-
tier’ of the Hellenistic World. A series of boundaries were crossed, not
only through the large number of victims among local non-combatants,
but especially through the relevant political consequences of such events.
Therefore, most poleis in the Eastern Mediterranean became the passive
objects of desire for the two leading powers in the region: Rome and
Pontus. They openly disputed for the political and military hegemony
of the East. In this context, as Fergus Millar has suggested, most of the
Greek towns were forced to make their own choices in foreign policy.
They either aligned themselves with Republican commanders or the Pon-
tic king.77 At the same time, internal leadership was divided into several
factions with opposing commercial, political and social interests, often
different from the interests of the demos. Yet, in the end, there was no
room for ambiguous positions. Any alliance, regardless whether it was
started early or late in the conflict, posed a limit to the post-war con-
ditions, and to the degree of economic and political recovery which the
Greek poleis, and their social institutions, were going to enjoy when that
‘ultimate frontier’ finally ceased to exist.
Barcelona-Oxford, December 
.–; Reinach , op. cit. (n. ),  n. ; Sherwin-White , op. cit. (n. ), –
; M. Alexander, Trials in the Late Roman Republic (Toronto ), ; de Callataÿ
, op. cit. (n. ), ; Saprykin , op. cit. (n. ), ff.; Dueck , op. cit.
(n. ), –.
76 McGing , op. cit. (n. ),–; Saprykin , op. cit. (n. ), –;
C. Eilers, ‘A Roman East: Pompey’s settlement to the death of Augustus’, in Erskine ,
op. cit. (n. ), –; H.-L. Fernoux, Notables et élites des cités de Bithynie aux époques
hellénistique et romaine (Lyon ), .
77 F. Millar , op.cit (n. ), –.
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